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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe? 
Clayton Littlejohn 
King's College London 
clayton.littlejohn@kcl.ac.uk 
 
0. Introduction 
Some say that we should follow the evidence.1 Some say that we should keep our 
stories straight.  It can be hard to do both. Suppose you decided, never mind 
why, to memorize the phone book. As you commit each new entry to memory 
you might believe, quite reasonably, that each new entry is correct. Having just 
committed the last entry to memory, you discover the remnants of an errata slip. 
It tells you that an error was found in the book. Unfortunately the slip is torn and 
missing the piece that tells you the error's location. Because you have good 
evidence to believe there is an error in the book, that's what you believe. Because 
you have good evidence to believe each entry, you believe each entry.  It's hard 
to see how the norms that govern belief could require you to believe everything 
the evidence supports and keep your story straight.  If you follow one norm, you 
violate the other. 
 When conflicts between putative norms arise, we have to pick winners 
and losers. In trying to decide whether we should proportion our beliefs to the 
evidence or see to it that our beliefs are consistent we're liable to be knocked 
around by intuitions that will increasingly seem unreliable. One problem we 
face, then, in trying to state a theory of rational belief is that of finding a 
principled basis for choosing between putative norms. 
 A second problem we face in stating a theory of rational belief has to do 
with a specific kind of rational requirement. Some of the clearest examples of 
rational requirements are wide-scope requirements, requirements that require us 
 
1  I would like to thank Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij, Bill Brewer, Thomas Byrne, 
Jochen Briesen, Jennifer Carr, Charles Cote-Bouchard, Marian David, Jeff Dunn, 
Kenny Easwaran, Anna-Maria Asunta Eder, Claire Field, Sandy Goldberg, 
Jimmy Goodrich, John Hyman, Mark Eli Kalderon, Jason Konek, Eliot 
Michaelson, David Owens, Matthew Parrott, David Papineau, Sherri Roush, 
Florian Steinberger, Robyn Repko Waller, Ralph Wedgwood, Jake Wojtowicz, 
Jose Zalabardo and audiences at King's College London, the University of 
Konstanz, and the University of Leuven for discussing these issues with me. I 
should add that Julien Dutant, Branden Fitelson, John Hawthorne, and Richard 
Pettigrew each provided much more extensive feedback than anyone could 
reasonably ask for. 
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to have or avoid certain combinations of attitudes.2 They might be requirements 
that tell us to keep our stories straight, keep our stories straight when our stories 
aren't very long, or see to it that we are probabilistically coherent. Although 
some of the clearest examples of rational requirements are wide-scope 
requirements, it isn't clear why there should be such requirements. These are 
requirements we'll conform to iff our attitudes exhibit the right patterns. Because 
the attitudes that exhibit these patterns might not be appropriate to the situation 
we're in, it isn't clear that we would always have good reason to have these 
attitudes. How, then, could rationality always require us to maintain these 
combinations of attitudes? 
 Our second problem is the problem of pretty patterns.3  If the ugliness of 
inconsistency or probabilistic incoherence doesn't explain the irrationality of 
small sets of inconsistent beliefs or the irrationality of probabilistic incoherence, 
what could?  When assessing attitudes that are supposed to fit the facts, why 
should it matter if these attitudes fit together? 
 In this paper, I want to look at a consequentialist approach to epistemic 
norms because it seems to give us the resources needed to solve our two 
problems about rational belief. Starting from the assumption that accuracy or 
truth is an epistemic good that calls for promotion, we can use norms from 
decision-theory to vindicate probabilism.4 It seems we can explain why rational 
beliefs form pretty patterns without assigning any independent value to these 
beliefs' aesthetic properties. Moreover, we can use these same resources to 
 
2 While some authors might think that all such requirements are wide-scope, 
Brunero (2013) and Titelbaum (2015b) show us how to derive narrow-scope 
requirements from wide-scope requirements. 
3  Wedgwood puts the problem this way when discussing views of practical 
rationality that posit wide-scope requirements, "According to the constructivists, 
the fact that one always ‘should’ make choices that meet … internal conditions of 
coherence … is not explained by the good external results to which such choices 
lead … This is a rather surprising idea. Why on earth should such a thing matter 
purely for its own sake? Perhaps choices that do not meet these internal 
conditions of coherence … are aesthetically unattractive in some way: they form 
a less pretty mental pattern than choices that do meet these conditions. But this 
hardly seems a sufficiently weighty consideration to explain why … one ‘should’ 
never make choices that do not satisfy these internal conditions" (2003: 217).  
4 See Joyce (1998, 2009, and MS) and Pettigrew (2013, 2016) for details. 
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explain why rational believers ought to tolerate certain kinds of inconsistency.5 If 
the accuracy-first framework really does help us get a handle on these problems, 
it would have an undeniable appeal.    
 Although the verdicts that our consequentialists try to vindicate certainly 
seem intuitively compelling and the apparent platitudes they argue from appear 
platitudinous, I have serious reservations about their approach to epistemic 
norms. In §1, I'll sketch the consequentialist arguments for probabilism and the 
normative Lockean view.  In §2 I shall argue that the consequentialist approach 
to the norms for partial belief only look promising when consider some 
artificially constrained sets of options. When we lift certain restrictions, the 
implications of the view are far from intuitive. In §3 I shall argue that the value 
theory that consequentialist need to vindicate probabilism is unmotivated. While 
I won't argue that partial beliefs aren't potential bearers of epistemic goodness, I 
will argue that we don't yet have a good grip on what their good-making 
features might be. In §4 I shall discuss the consequentialist argument for the 
normative Lockean view.  After presenting a series of objections I draw some 
general lessons about the epistemic good and the relations between full and 
partial belief in §5.      
 
1. Veritism, Conseqentialism, and Epistemic Norms 
Let's start with a rough sketch of two consequentialist arguments for two 
epistemic norms. The first is an argument for probabilism, the view that says that 
rationality requires us to be probabilistically coherent. 6  The second is an 
argument for a normative Lockean view, the view that it is rational to believe p 
iff it is rational to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in p.7   
 The assumptions that figure in these arguments are pretty much what 
you'd expect.  Because our accuracy-first epistemologists are consequentialists, 
they tell to evaluate the subject's options in terms of the values realized by the 
attitudes contained in those options and they'll then give us some norms that tell 
us what's rational to believe in light of these options and their ranking. The 
intended result is an argument for probabilism that rests on intuitively plausible 
claims about the value of accuracy.   
 
5 See Easwaran and Fitelson (2015) and Fitelson (MS) for discussion of evidential 
norms and consistency.  If interested in accuracy-first defenses of other norms, 
see Greaves' and Wallace's (2006) discussion of conditionalization. 
6 For discussion, see Joyce (1998, 2009, MS) and Pettigrew (2013, 2016).   
7  For discussion, see Dorst (MS), Easwaran (Forthcoming), and Fitelson 
(Forthcoming). 
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 Let's start with the value theory. Our epistemic consequentialists are 
veritists. They think that there is one and only one fundamental epistemic good: 
accurate belief.8 The one interesting complication is that our consequentialists 
think there might be two kinds of accuracy and two kinds of epistemic good:  
The relevant success criterion for full beliefs is well-
known and uncontroversial ... An epistemically 
rational agent must strive to hold a system of full 
beliefs that strikes the best attainable overall balance 
between the epistemic good or fully believing truths 
an the epistemic evil of fully believing falsehoods ... 
My position is that a rational partial believer must 
aim not simply to accept truths and reject falsehoods, 
but to hold partial beliefs that are gradationally 
accurate by adjusting the strengths of her opinions in 
a way that best maximizes her degree of confidence in 
truths while minimizing her degree of confidence in 
falsehoods. For the same reasons that a person should 
aim to hold full beliefs that are categorically accurate, 
so too should she aim to hold partial beliefs that are 
gradationally accurate (Joyce 1998: 579). 
It is easy to see what accuracy for full belief amounts to. If you believe p outright, 
this state is categorically accurate iff p. To see how well you're doing 
epistemically we assign a positive value to your true beliefs, R, a negative value 
to your false beliefs, W, and the aggregate epistemic good realized by your full 
beliefs will be the sum.  What if you don't believe p outright but have some 
partial belief concerning p? In this case we focus on the gradational accuracy of 
your belief:  
The categorical good of fully believing truths is 
replaced by the gradational good of investing high 
credence in truths (the higher the better); the 
categorical evil of fully believing falsehoods is 
replaced by the gradational evil of investing high 
credence in falsehoods (the higher the worse) (Joyce 
MS). 
To see how this works, consider a simple case. Suppose Agnes has opinions 
about p and ~p. Her credence function, b, assigns .6 to p and .4 to ~p.  The ideal 
credence function, i, assigns 1 to truths and 0 to falsehoods in a world. We can 
see how well Agnes is doing in some world by measuring the distance between 
 
8 For defenses of veritism, see Goldman (1999) and (possibly) Lynch (2004).   
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her credences and the ideal credences.  The Brier score is the standard way to 
evaluate the accuracy of a subject's credences.9 For each of Agnes' opinions we 
subtract the value i assigns from the value b assigns and square it. We then sum 
these values to get a value that represents the total gradational inaccuracy of 
Agnes' credences. When comparing two scores, a lower score represents less 
distance from the ideal and less total epistemic disutility.  As with the case of full 
belief, the aggregate good realized by a set of partial beliefs is simply the sum of 
the values associated with each partial belief. The main difference is that the 
scoring rules for partial belief tell us that a lower score is preferable to a higher 
score as higher scores represent a greater distance between your set of partial 
beliefs and the ideal.10  
 With the basic value theory before us, we can turn to the theory of 
rationality.  In slogan form, epistemic consequentialists say that rational belief is 
good enough belief. If they are maximizers, they'll say that we're required to 
believe the best we can.11  If we want to know whether having a full belief or 
partial belief concerning p is rationally permitted, we think about the epistemic 
value realized in feasible options where the subject has or lacks the full or partial 
belief concerning p. Assuming that our consequentialists are maximizers, 
rationality permits believing p if the options involving the belief in p does as well 
in terms of promoting epistemic value as the options that lack this belief. Belief is 
required if the best options all include it. It's forbidden if the best options lack it. 
Since the fundamental good is accuracy, the options should be ranked from best 
to worst in terms of the accuracy and inaccuracy of the attitudes contained in 
these options.   
 When it comes to partial belief Agnes should aim to minimize total 
gradational inaccuracy. She should minimize the distance between her credences 
and the ideal. Bearing this in mind, here is a quick sketch of an argument for 
probabilism. Probabilism tells us that Agnes would be irrational if her credences 
in p and ~p did not sum to 1.  It turns out that for every probabilistically 
incoherent credence function defined over a fixed set of propositions (e.g., p and 
 
9 See Joyce (1998) and Leitgeb and Pettigrew (2010) for discussion of the merits of 
using the Brier score to measure a credence function's inaccuracy. 
10 This difference will matter later. It isn't essential to the framework because, as 
we'll see, the basic framework can be modified so that the scoring rules for 
partial belief more closely resemble those for full belief, but it's going to be useful 
to start with the simple scoring rules to understand the difficulties discussed in 
the next section. 
11 Subject to the proviso that 'best' might be understood as subjectively best, 
prospectively best, objectively best, etc.  
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~p) there is an alternative coherence credence function defined over the same set 
of propositions that would be less inaccurate in every possible world. Thus, if 
we're thinking of Agnes' options as the credences she could have in the 
propositions in this fixed set, we would think that the rationality of her credences 
would be determined by the gradational inaccuracy of the credences in these 
propositions. An option involving incoherent credences should rank lower than 
an option containing a coherent set. Moreover, no coherent credence function 
defined over a set of propositions would be weakly dominated by an alternative 
function defined over that same set of propositions.12 Thus, using the Brier score 
to measure the total gradational inaccuracy of Agnes' credence function and 
some norms concerning dominance, we get the result that rationality requires her 
to be probabilistically coherent. Agnes isn't special in this regard. If rationality 
requires it from her, it requires it from us, too. 
 If you think that this is a plausible rationale for probabilism, it might seem 
that we've solved the pretty patterns problem. Any solution to the pretty 
patterns problem should satisfy two desiderata. First, in stating the solution we 
cannot assume that the patterns themselves are desirable. Because we don't want 
to fetishize patterns, we should focus on the total value realized by a subject's 
options and use our ranking of options to vindicate the idea that some putative 
pattern is rationally required. Second, the patterns should be pretty.  The 
accuracy-first approach seems to satisfy both desiderata. Being probabilistically 
coherent is a pretty pattern and the argument just sketched seems to show that if 
your attitudes don't exhibit the right pattern there is an alternative set of non-
dominated attitudes that is better than your present set.  Thus, if you care about 
accuracy, you should care about the pattern for reasons that have nothing to do 
with its aesthetic properties. 
 This should give the reader some sense of how the accuracy-firsters would 
go about justifying putative norms for credences, but what about norms for full 
belief? Consider an accuracy-first argument for a normative Lockean view, a 
view that says that it is rational to have a full belief in p iff it is rational to have a 
sufficiently high credence in p. Let's suppose that it is rational to believe p iff 
neither disbelieving p nor suspending on p will have a greater expected epistemic 
value than believing p. The relevant values are the positive values that attach to 
categorically accurate beliefs and the negative values that attach to categorically 
inaccurate beliefs. Let's say that each false belief realizes the same disvalue, W, 
and each true belief realizes the same value, R.  Assuming that the subject's 
credences are probabilistically coherent, we can say that it would be rational for 
 
12 The formal details are discussed in Joyce (1998). The argument was inspired by 
work by di Finetti (1974).  
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the subject to believe p iff her credence in p is greater than or equal to W/R+W.13 If 
a subject fails to believe p when her credence in p is greater than this value, she 
fails to maximize expected epistemic accuracy. As the veritist sees things, this is a 
failure to maximize expected epistemic value.  
 This presentation has been brief. It doesn't cover the technical details. My 
aim here is to contest the significance of the formal results for debates about 
epistemic norms, not the results themselves.  
 
2. Pretty Patterns and Partial Beliefs 
Let's consider a view that combines gradational veritism with epistemic 
consequentialism (GVEC). Because GVEC is a consequentialist view, its 
proponents offer a theory of rational partial belief by arguing that partial beliefs 
by identifying some value these beliefs can realize, telling us how to rank options 
in terms of the realization of this value, and then by telling us how this ranking 
bears on the rationality of partial belief.  Roughly, rational partial beliefs will be 
rational because of how they promote a good that calls for promotion. Because 
 
13 See Dorst (MS) and Easwaran (Forthcoming: 13) for discussion of arguments 
for a normative Lockean view.  There is an issue that we cannot explore here that 
probably deserves further consideration. In Littlejohn (2012), I explained that if 
we want a view on which we need to have stronger evidence for p than for ~p to 
rationally believe p, we need to assign greater weight to the disvalue associated 
with a false belief than we do to the value associated with a true belief.  Should 
we take a similar line with the values associated with gradational accuracy and 
inaccuracy? That is, should we say that the magnitude of disvalue associated 
with a degree of gradational inaccuracy is greater than the magnitude of value 
associated with a comparable degree of gradational accuracy? If we do and we 
assign the same values or disvalues to each degree of gradational accuracy or 
inaccuracy, it will be difficult to see how it could be rational to have a credence of 
.5 in p when the evidence supports p and ~p equally. That state would include 
equal degrees of gradational accuracy and inaccuracy and would be an overall 
bad state to be in. We either need to assign the same magnitude of value and 
disvalue to equal degrees of gradational accuracy and inaccuracy so that the total 
value realized by a credence of .5 is 0 or we need to say that the same degrees of 
gradational inaccuracy get different values depending upon how much total 
inaccuracy a state involves. These complications are required to get the desirable 
result that having a credence of .5 in p is a state that has neutral value, but they 
seem to introduce a degree of unnaturalness into the underlying value theory. It 
forces us to try to explain why gradational accuracy has these features that 
categorical accuracy does not. 
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the view incorporates gradational veritism, it ranks options in terms of the 
gradational accuracy associated with a subject's partial beliefs. Its proponents see 
gradationally accurate and inaccurate partial beliefs as playing a theoretical role 
similar that of hedons and dolors in hedonistic utilitarianism.14 
 Remember that the crucial formal results for the argument for probabilism 
were these. First, when comparing credence functions defined over a fixed set of 
propositions a subject will be dominated if her credence function is not a 
probability function. Second, when we're comparing credence functions defined 
over a fixed set of propositions a subject will avoid being dominated if her 
credence function is a probability function. These results might seem to give the 
consequentialists what they need to vindicate probabilism because it seems that 
consequentialists would agree that it is irrational to opt for an option that's 
dominated and rational to opt for an option that's not dominated. Unfortunately, 
things aren't quite this simple.  It isn't clear that the formal result establishes 
much of anything that a consequentialist would or should care about.  
 These results tell us nothing about credence functions defined over 
different sets of propositions.15 It's not clear that this set of options these scoring 
rules score is the set of options that consequentialists would care about.  
Maximizing consequentialists want to know whether an act or attitude is 
included in the best feasible options.  Not only is it unclear whether each possible 
set of credences concerning a fixed set of propositions should count as a feasible 
option, it isn't clear why the feasible options should be limited to options in 
which the subject has credences concerning a single fixed set of propositions.16    
 
14  See Pettigrew (2016: 10), for example. Much in the way that the value 
associated with hedons and dolors are thought by utilitarians to give moral 
norms their 'normative force', some writers (e.g., Talbot (2014)) suggest the value 
associated with accurate belief is supposed to serve as the source of normative 
force that addresses the kind of skepticism about the normative force of 
epistemic norms expressed by writers like Papineau (2013).  
15 See Pettigrew (2016: 4). 
16  A subject might know that she couldn't have certain credences owing to 
contingent facts about the causal structure of the world. If, for some reason, she 
knew that it would be nomologically impossible to have a probabilistically 
coherent set of credences, shouldn't a consequentialist say that rationality 
requires her to adopt the set that minimizes expected gradational inaccuracy and 
would be rational if she had these credences? If so, GVEC does not show that 
rationality invariably requires probabilistic coherence, only that it does so when 
the contingent causal structure of the world allows a subject to have such a set of 
credences.  If a consequentialist in ethics purported to show that an equal 
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 Remember the guiding thought in the argument for probabilism was this. 
Once we agree that the fundamental values are gradational accuracy and 
inaccuracy, we should agree that it would be irrational for a subject to have a set 
of credences if she can see that there is an alternative that involves less 
gradational inaccuracy or an alternative that is closer to the ideal.  Recall Joyce's 
suggestion that rationality requires us to strive to hold a set of partial beliefs that 
have high degrees of gradational accuracy. Our scoring rules don't support this 
suggestion. They don't tell us that Agnes would be worse off for failing to have 
partial beliefs like the ones Joyce describes. What the scoring rules show is that 
for any set of credences over some fixed set of propositions Agnes could have it 
would be better for those opinions have low amounts of gradational inaccuracy.  
We can't use the scoring rules to identify any reason for Agnes to get in the 
partial belief game in the first place.17   
 If we want to show that Agnes really should aspire to have partial beliefs 
that have certain properties (e.g., they are coherent and they minimize 
gradational inaccuracy), we need to think of Agnes' available options as 
involving suspension and opinionation and we need a value theory that tells that 
Agnes could be better off for being opinionated.   
 If b is Agnes' credence function, she has a credence of .6 and .4 in p and ~p 
respectively. If Agnes' aim is to avoid being dominated by an alternative set of 
credences scored for their total gradational inaccuracy, she should avoid an 
incoherent credence function like b' that assigns .7 and .4 to p and ~p respectively. 
What about a function like b'' that assigns .6 to p and is undefined for ~p? If 
Agnes' aim is to minimize gradational inaccuracy, we know apriori that b'' will 
contain less by way of gradational inaccuracy than b. As such, b'' would be closer 
to the ideal credence function in every possible world.18 If b'' is Agnes' credence 
 
distribution of goods maximized utility but then conceded that their argument 
assumed for no particularly good reason that feasible options involving great 
amounts of total utility and an unequal distribution of these goods could be 
ignored for the purposes of ranking an agent's options, we wouldn't be 
impressed by this kind of consequentialist vindication of egalitarianism.      
17 I suppose someone might argue that the partial beliefs are unavoidable in some 
sense, but it still seems strange to think that we should lament the fact that we're 
saddled with middling credences. At any rate, I think it's a useful exercise to take 
seriously Gibbard's suggestion that we can fruitfully think about these issues if, 
'We ask whether those are the credences that, in light of her evidence, she most 
prefers to have, the ones that she would choose if she could choose her credences 
at will' (2007: 150) and offer our rational believer the option of opting out.  
18 The sum of two (non-zero) distances is always greater than one summand. 
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function, Agnes doesn't satisfy the demands imposed by probabilism. If Agnes' 
has the credences associated with b'', she is probabilistically incoherent. Thus, it 
seems there is a real problem with the consequentialist argument for 
probabilism. While Agnes won't be dominated by an incoherent alternative to b 
defined for p and ~p, she knows apriori that there is an incoherent alternative to b 
that has less by way of gradational inaccuracy in every possible world. She can 
move closer to the ideal in every possible world by simply 'dropping' a non-
extremal credence.19  If she should prefer less gradational inaccuracy to more, 
shouldn't she prefer b'' to b? Consequentialists have to think that it's irrational to 
prefer an acknowledged worse state of affairs to one that's better, so wouldn't it 
be irrational for Agnes to 'choose' b over b''? 
 GVEC faces the problem of partial opinionation.  Suppose the proponents 
of GVEC want to allow that there can be rationally acceptable credences that 
include some non-extremal credences. Among other things, they want to say that 
this set is rational only if it is probabilistically coherent and it isn't dominated by 
an alternative. Let's suppose that the set of credences associated with b is one 
such collection. When a gradational veritist proposes that this is a set of 
rationally acceptable credences, we can find an alternative set that differs from b 
only insofar as it doesn't include any opinion about ~p (e.g., b''). This alternative 
is probabilistically incoherent but it involves less gradational inaccuracy in every 
possible world than b. The problem isn't just with b, mind you. We can do this 
with any coherent set of credences that involves non-extremal credences in a 
proposition and its negation. Thus, we get the troubling result that if there are 
any rationally acceptable non-extremal credences, there will be a rationally 
acceptable set of credences that is probabilistically incoherent that we know 
apriori involves less gradational inaccuracy in every possible world.  Thus, if the 
more expansive set of coherent credences were rationally permitted, the 
incoherent contracted set would be rationally permitted. (This follows from the 
consequentialist idea that if one option is rationally permitted and another ranks 
at least as well in terms of the ranking value this second one must be permitted, 
too.)  Moreover, if rationality requires us not to have credences that are 
dominated in this way, no rationally acceptable set of credences involves non-
extremal credence. (We can always move closer to the ideal by jettisoning 
another non-extremal credence.)  This can't be a consequence that proponents of 
GVEC would be happy with.   
 
19  I've learned from Robyn Repko Waller that this was essentially Curious 
George's insight about golf. If the golfer's aim is just to avoid a high score, it's 
best not to play. 
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 Unless GVEC is modified, its proponents are saddled with two 
unattractive options. If they think that some rationally acceptable sets of 
credences include non-extremal credences, they'll have to say that some very 
ugly sets of credences are also rationally permitted. They'll lose their argument 
for probabilism. If, however, they think that ugly sets of credences are irrational, 
they get the troubling skeptical result that it is always irrational to have non-
extremal credences. Maybe they can still get the result that a rational set of 
credences will always be probabilistically coherent, but this feels like an 
uninteresting result if all sets of credences involving non-extremal credences are 
deemed irrational.20   
 In discussion, people have suggested two potential solutions. The first 
involves reformulating the norm. When it comes to evaluating certain sets of 
options over fixed sets of propositions, it might make sense to work under the 
assumption that the fundamental epistemic norm is one that enjoins us to 
minimize gradational accuracy, but when we expand the set of options to include 
suspension we need to introduce a different norm. The second focuses on the 
value theory. The gradational veritist might add to the initial value theory to 
explain why it's sometimes good to have partial beliefs.   
 
2.1 Average or Total Consequentialism? 
Here's a natural diagnosis of the problem of partial opinionation. The problem 
arises because we're assuming that options should be ranked in terms of distance 
from an ideal or in terms of the minimization of gradational inaccuracy. The 
problem only arises if we assume that a subject should be worried about total 
gradational accuracy, but the problem does not arise if the norm that matters is 
one that enjoins us to minimize average inaccuracy. Instead of scoring a subject's 
credences by summing the squared distances between the subject's credences 
and the ideal, we can score a subject's credences by summing the squared 
 
20 Of course, if they think that having extremal credence in a proposition amounts 
to having a full belief that isn't a partial belief, the upshot is that there are no 
epistemic norms that permit partial beliefs. One of the attractions of the present 
project was that it was supposed to help us see how it could be rational to have 
high degrees of credence in inconsistent sets of propositions.  I thought that 
many people were troubled by Ryan's (1991) defense of the consistency norm for 
full belief, but it seems that we're led to embrace something much more radical if 
the skeptical line is taken, for now it seems that the reason that we shouldn't 
have inconsistent sets of beliefs in cases like our original preface is simply 
because we shouldn't have any beliefs (partial or full) except in the cases where 
extremal credence is rationally permitted. 
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distances between these credences and then dividing by the number of opinions. 
When we compare b and b'' we get the result we want. If Agnes had b as her 
credence function she would be coherent, she could potentially be rational, and 
her credences would have a lower average inaccuracy than they would if she had 
b'' as her credence function.21 
 This is a neat fix, but the resulting view is unsatisfactory.  When we 
combine gradational veritism with average epistemic consequentialism 
(GVAEC), the resulting view won't vindicate an important intuition about the 
virtues of well-founded opinion. The people I love tell me that I should have 
more opinions. I don't have views about things like life on other planets, Jeremy 
Corbyn, or the housing market. I've been told that there's something attractive 
about David's mix of curiosity and confidence. His evidence always supports his 
attitudes and he seems to have opinions about everything (e.g., politics, the 
morality of cheating in sport, the number of colors, and the best places to fish in 
Essex).  If you compare our opinions in terms of average inaccuracy our attitudes 
do equally well, but wouldn't David be doing better if he's more opinionated 
than timid thinkers like me? 
 GVAEC trades off one problem for another. If it solves the problem of 
partial opinionation, it won't solve the problem of population (i.e., the problem 
of explaining why we should strive to have more well-founded partial beliefs).22 
If we want our accuracy-first view to look anything like hedonism, it better tell 
us that, other things equal, it's better to have more partial beliefs with high 
degrees of gradational accuracy. It should treat such these non-ideal credences as 
hedons, not dolors. Unfortunately, GVAEC doesn't deliver that result. If the aim 
is to minimize average gradational inaccuracy, I couldn't have a reason to take on 
new opinions like David does. By hypothesis, we do equally well in terms of 
average gradational inaccuracy.   
 GVAEC also generates a skeptical worry.  If the fundamental norm enjoins 
us to miminimze average gradational inaccuracy, we face considerable rational 
pressure to avoid non-extremal credences. If we followed the narrator's advice 
from the Meditations by believing only what was indubitable and having only 
extremal credences in certainties, we would be do better minimizing average 
gradational inaccuracy than we would if we had non-extremal credences 
concerning contingent matters of fact.   
 
21 Eleanor Knox first suggested this response to me in conversation. Pettigrew 
(MS) discusses the merits of this view in connection to a different problem I will 
discuss momentarily. 
22 Richard Pettigrew pointed out that the population problem was first discussed 
in Carr (2015). See his (MS) for his response.  
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 Finally, GVAEC doesn't solve the problem of pretty patterns. It might 
seem to vindicate probabilism because we fail to minimize average gradational 
inaccuracy if we are probabilistically incoherent, but it doesn't satisfy our two 
desiderata. We don't want to fetishize patterns, so we want to rank options in 
terms of their total intrinsic value. GVAEC doesn't do that. It ranks options in 
terms of the average inaccuracy. It seems fetishistic precisely because it ranks 
options without an eye towards total value. 
  
2.2 Carrots and Sticks 
Nothing good could come from moving from GVEC to GVAEC so let's focus on 
the former view. We won't get a satisfactory response to the problem of partial 
opinionation unless we attend to the details of gradational veritism and enrich 
the scoring rules. 
 Let's consider a second diagnosis of the problem of partial opinionation.  
The arguments for probabilism assume that sets of coherent but non-extremal 
credences are always worse than the ideal. GVEC then characterizes the rational 
believer's aim as that of minimizing inaccuracy. Thus, there's always an incentive 
to 'drop' non-extremal credences and minimize your number of partial beliefs. 
Whenever you drop some non-zero distance from the ideal, you 'move' closer to 
the ideal and whenever you take on some partial belief you move some non-zero 
distance from the ideal. 
 Since the arguments for probabilism were designed only to show 
something about sets of credence functions defined for fixed sets of propositions, 
nothing really turned on whether it would be good to have the credences 
associated with these credence functions. Once we allow for the possibility of 
suspension, however, it matters whether there's any potential upside to having 
partial beliefs. It seems natural to think that the value realized by suspension is 0. 
What the gradational veritists have to do is show that Less than Zero is false and 
give us an account of gradational accuracy that tells us that there's some reason 
for Agnes to get into the partial belief game: 
Less than Zero: The total value realized by the ideal 
set of credences in a world is 0 or greater than 0 but 
the value associated with some non-extremal 
credence is always less than 0. 
Until they show that partial beliefs are potentially good states to be in, we're 
stuck choosing between ugly patterns and skeptical pressures. 
 Let's consider making two changes to the gradational veritist's value 
theory. First, suppose that some non-extremal credences are good states to be in 
because they have more gradational accuracy than some valueless state. Second, 
suppose there is a neutral state, a credence that has no epistemic value whatever 
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and was thus of comparable value to suspension.  The natural suggestion is a 
credence of .5.23 We could then say that any credence with a higher degree of 
gradational accuracy than a credence of .5 would be a good state to be in and that 
any credence with a higher degree of gradational inaccuracy would be a bad 
state to be in. As your credence in a truth increases, things get better. As your 
credence in a falsehood increases, things get worse. We now have our carrots and 
sticks. We can now see why it's good to be like David. Each partial belief he has 
that has more gradational accuracy than the neutral credence would be a good 
state to be in. The more states like this, the better.  Once we introduce a potential 
upside to partial belief, we can explain why partial opinionation is bad. Initially, 
it looked as if GVEC was committed to the unfortunate result that it would be 
better to have b'' as your credence function because the credences associated with 
b'' have less total gradational inaccuracy than those associated with b. Now it 
 
23 Note that 'neutral' can be understood in two ways. First, we might say that it is 
neutral in the sense that it contains equal measures of accuracy and inaccuracy. 
Second, we might say that it is neutral in the sense that it contains no value. It's 
this second reading that's operative in the discussion. I'll assume here for no 
good reason that they come to the same thing.  When it comes to categorical 
accuracy, an epistemic state that contains equal amounts of categorical accuracy 
and inaccuracy is one that the epistemic consequentialist should say is overall 
worse than a state that involves suspending on the two propositions. This raises 
an interesting question that would need to be explored by gradational veritists if 
they wished to develop this view: should we say that equal degrees of categorical 
accuracy and inaccuracy balance out? If so, it seems that there is a surprising 
difference between the weights of the comparative values realized by categorical 
accuracy and inaccuracy and gradational accuracy and inaccuracy.  If we had a 
view on which each degree of gradational accuracy and each degree of 
gradational inaccuracy realized the same amount of epistemic value or disvalue 
and we said that in terms of its weight the value associated with a degree of 
gradational inaccuracy exceeded the weight of the value associated with a 
comparable degree of gradational accuracy, we would get the result that a state 
like a credence of .5 that contained equal measures of gradational accuracy and 
inaccuracy would be a bad state to be in however the world happened to be. 
There are ways of avoiding this result (e.g., assigning variable amounts of value 
to comparable degrees of accuracy or inaccuracy or insisting that the value and 
disvalue associated with a credence of .5 washes out) but it seems rather ad hoc to 
posit features of a value theory to get the pleasing formal results in the absence 
of any independent justification to think that there are these surprising 
complications.    
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looks as if b'' is potentially a bad state to be in. If p is true, having a credence less 
than .5 in ~p would be a good state to be in.24 
 For all its attractions, this modification doesn't remove the difficulties for 
GVEC. We needed to introduce a neutral credence to make sense of the idea that 
some alternatives to suspension are potentially good or bad states to be in. This 
was supposed to mitigate the rational pressure against opinionation. Once we 
introduce neutral credences, we lose our argument for probabilism. 
Consequentialists think that if we know apriori that two options realize the same 
objective value it's impossible for one state to be permitted and the other 
forbidden.  Suppose Agnes has credences of .5 in p and in ~p. If we compare her 
credences to a contracted set where she has a credence of .5 in p and no credence 
concerning ~p, we see that these credences have the same objective value in every 
possible world. It would be irrational for Agnes to have a credence of .5 in p and 
no credence in ~p but the modified view doesn't deliver this result. The problem 
of partial opinionation has been moved, not removed. 
 Because the current formulation of GVEC assigns positive value to a wide 
range of credences, it's the only view thus far that resembles hedonistic 
utilitarianism. In some ways, this might seem to be an advantage in dealing with 
the population problem and the problem of partial opinionation. Unfortunately, 
this new value theory generates a skeptical worry of its own. Suppose Agnes 
decided to study American history. We might imagine that things go quite well 
for her. She reads the literature and follows the arguments where they lead. The 
result is a set of opinions with high degrees of gradational accuracy. This should 
be enough to ensure that her opinions are rational, but nothing I've said tells us 
anything about where this set of opinions ranks amongst her alternatives. Had 
she used her mental energy and resources differently, Agnes could have learned 
more by dedicating herself to settling questions that would be easier to settle. She 
could have done mental math and traced out the obvious logical consequences of 
obvious things, for example. Had she done that instead, she might have had a 
greater number of opinions about these matters and no opinions about American 
history.   
 This fact about comparative value matters to consequentialists so it should 
matter to epistemic consequentialists.25 We have to remember that gradational 
 
24  Julien Dutant and Matthew Parrott first suggested this response in 
conversation, but neither endorsed it. Richard Pettigrew also suggested a 
response along these lines and coined the phrase 'neutral credence'. 
25 In Littlejohn (2012: 47), I raise this as a problem for views that tell us to 
maximize the epistemic value realized by full beliefs.  In Littlejohn (forthcoming 
b), I discuss the relationship between this objection to certain forms of epistemic 
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accuracy, like death, can be bad because it deprives us of some greater good. 
However accurate Agnes' current attitudes are, they can only be rational if they 
compare favorably to alternatives ranked in terms of total gradational accuracy. 
In thinking about alternatives as consequentialists should, we are not thinking of 
alternatives as alternative opinions over fixed sets of propositions but alternative 
feasible options, accessible possibilities in which Agnes has some opinions and 
forgoes others for uninteresting reasons like limits to computational capacity, the 
need to attend to some matters and ignore others, and the time it takes to settle 
the questions that concern her. To my mind, the fact that Agnes could have 
achieved greater amounts of total gradational accuracy by choosing to do mental 
math instead of investing her time in the careful but demanding field of 
American history tells us nothing about the rational status of her opinions about 
the causes of the Civil War. This is an anti-consequentialist point. It indicates that 
the rational status of her opinions is determined independently from 
consideration of the total value contained in the alternative options.  
 The best formulation of GVEC isn't good enough. Once GVEC takes on 
the resources it needs to address the problems of partial opinionation, it 
resembles consequentialist views that say that no matter how good an option is it 
can fail to be good enough because of the opportunity cost associated with 
making it actual. I don't see how any further permutation will avoid some 
combination of the problems discussed here, so we should conclude that CVEC 
doesn't solve the pretty patterns problem or vindicate probabilism. Once we try 
to understand what's wrong with Agnes if she's partially opinionated or what's 
good about David who follows Joyce's advice in seeking partial beliefs with high 
degrees of gradational accuracy, we see that the view's implications aren't 
terribly attractive.   
 
3. Two Kinds of Accuracy  
When presented with purported counterexamples some consequentialists try to 
beat their critics with cleverness. After some tinkering and modifying, they'll try 
to show that their view now vindicates their critics' intuitions. Some prefer to 
outSmart their critics. They'll try to convince you that it's a virtue of their view 
that it has some seemingly troubling implication.  If armed with a good value 
theory, this might seem like a good strategy for the epistemic consequentialist. If 
gradational accuracy really is a fundamental epistemic good and it really does 
call for promotion, maybe Agnes is being unreasonable for wasting her limited 
resources on history. Maybe we should all just stick to mental math. 
 
consequentialism and Ross' (1930) criticism of the utilitarian conception of 
beneficence.      
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  This kind of move is only tempting if we think that the underlying value 
theory is sound. Is it? Joyce suggests that we should aim to have gradationally 
accurate partial beliefs and categorically accurate full beliefs for the very same 
reason. This suggests that we might value these kinds of accuracy for the very 
same reason. Do we?  I don't think so.  I have to confess that I find much of the 
discussion of epistemic value opaque. Because these discussions often start from 
assumptions that I don't accept, I've tried to identify the strongest arguments for 
veritism. The best arguments I've found all come from Lynch's work on the value 
of truth. In this section, I'll argue that these considerations support parts of 
categorical veritism but don't support gradational veritism. Until further 
arguments are found, we should think of gradational veritism as an unmotivated 
motivator. If GVEC's implications are as bad as they seem, we shouldn't feel 
pressured into accepting them on the grounds that they're supported by a good 
theory of epistemic value. 
 In the vast literature on the Meno Problem the assumption that true belief 
is good is often taken for granted.26  It is fair to ask, though, why we should think 
that accuracy is a promotional good (i.e., a good that calls for promotion).27  To 
motivate the idea that truth matters, Lynch asks us to reflect on our aversion to 
life in the experience machine. In spite of how pleasant that life would be, 
something is missing:  
In preferring not to live in either the vat or the Russell 
world, I do not simply prefer that the world be a 
certain way. My preference involves my beliefs and 
their proper functioning, so to speak. For not only do 
I not want to live in a world where I am a brain in a 
vat, I also don’t want to live in a world where I am 
not so deceived, but believe that I am. That is, if such 
and such is the case, I want to believe that it is, and if 
I believe that it is, I want it to be the case. We can put 
this by saying that I want my beliefs and reality to be 
a certain way—I want my beliefs to track reality, to 
 
26 For gentle introductions, see Hyman (2015) and Kvanvig (2003). 
27 Not every appropriate use of 'good' corresponds to a promotional good. Even 
if you think that the notion of good simpliciter is coherent and think of this kind 
of good and good-for are promotional goods, there is also the attributive use and 
normative use. These latter two uses do not pick out promotional goods, things 
that by their very nature call for promotion.  See Baron (1995) and Zimmerman 
(2015) for helpful discussion. 
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“accord with how the world actually is”—which is to 
say I want them to be true (2004: 18).   
In an earlier passage he rejects the suggestion that the value that attaches to 
accurate belief is just a matter of their instrumental value on the grounds that this 
doesn't capture what's disturbing about the thought that we might be deceived 
and have no inkling of it. Even if things go equally well for us if we're deceived 
or informed, there is something bad about living a life in which there's an 
undetectable gap between appearance and reality. 
 There are two points to take from this. The negative point is this. While it 
would be good to have beliefs that get you to San Jose if that's where you want to 
be, the value that interests us doesn't derive from the way in which certain beliefs 
happen to knock us down the paths that take us where we want to be.28  The 
positive point is that the primary reason that accurate beliefs are good (when 
they are good) is that these beliefs track reality and so enable us to keep in touch 
with parts of reality that we're concerned with when we rely on our beliefs. 
Specifically, they track the parts of reality that consist of facts, the facts that we're 
curious about and the facts that we hope figure in reasoning. In other words, if 
you recognize that a subject's reasons for feeling things, doing things, and 
believing things consist of certain facts that the subject has in mind, the reason 
that accurate beliefs are good (when they are good) is that such beliefs play a 
distinctive role in providing us with reasons.29 There is no other state of mind or 
mental event that puts these reasons into our possession or enables us to be 
guided by them in feeling things, thinking things, or doing things.  
 Since a belief cannot track reality without being accurate, we can see why 
accuracy is a condition on good belief. If we care about being guided by reasons, 
it makes sense to care about whether our beliefs can serve as such guides.  We 
can get to San Jose in many ways. We can follow a map or we can be kidnapped 
and driven there. We don't need accurate beliefs to get to San Jose, but we do 
need accurate beliefs to be guided by certain considerations. You cannot be 
relieved that you've made it to San Jose or happy that you didn't take a bus that 
dumps you off in Berkeley if you don't know that you're in San Jose and don't 
know that you're not in Berkeley.  
 This best explains why some accurate beliefs realize the fundamental 
epistemic good:  
Reasons and Epistemic Goodness 
 
28 Hyman (2015) stresses this point in his discussion of the Meno problem. 
29 For a defense of this conception of reasons as facts, see Alvarez (2010), Hyman 
(2015), Littlejohn (2012), Unger (1975), and Williamson (2000). 
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Beliefs are valuable (when they are) because these 
beliefs track the part of reality that consist of facts and 
thereby enable us to feel things for reasons, believe 
things for reasons, and do things for reasons that 
consist of these facts.  They are a source of potential 
motivating reasons (i.e., reasons that can be the 
subject's reason for feeling, believing, and doing 
things).  
While this account provides a neat explanation as to why some accurate beliefs 
are good (i.e., the accurate beliefs that track reality), the account doesn't support 
gradational veritism. It doesn't cover partial belief.  Unless some partial belief is, 
inter alia, a full belief, it cannot play the functional role that full beliefs are 
supposed to. Thus, the grounds for thinking of some accurate full beliefs as good 
give us no reason to think of partial beliefs as potentially desirable states to be in. 
Excessive focus on the links between belief and bodily movement has obscured 
this. While both a full belief and a partial belief can lead you to take an umbrella, 
you need a full belief to regret that it's raining, be happy that it's not hailing, or 
be surprised that it's not sunny outside.30  
 To believe, feel, or do something for a reason, the fact you have in mind 
has to capture the light in which the relevant response struck you as appropriate 
or fitting. It's only possible for the relevant fact to capture the light in which you 
took the response to be appropriate when you fully believe the fact to be a fact. 
(You cannot be angry with your neighbor for the reason that they took your 
paper if you do not fully believe they took it but merely assign some middling 
credence to this hypothesis.) Once we see that full belief is required for feeling 
things for reasons that consist of facts, it's easy to see that similar points hold for 
action and belief. You can take an umbrella if you suspect that it will rain or fear 
that it will rain, but you cannot take the umbrella for the reason that it will rain if 
you don't have the full belief that it will. If all you care about is staying dry, you 
might think that little turns on whether you have a full belief or a partial one, but 
we can choose better cases. If you are punishing someone, you had better fully 
believe that they did it. If not, your reason for punishing them couldn't be that 
they committed the relevant misdeed.   
 Categorically accurate beliefs are good (when they are good) because they 
play a distinctive role in providing us with potential motivating reasons (i.e., the 
things that can be our reasons for V-ing). The ability to provide us with these 
reasons explains the value of the full beliefs that are good in the fundamental 
 
30  See Adler (2002), Buchak (2014), Gordon (1987), and Owens (2013) for 
discussion of the relationship between full belief and emotion or blame.  
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way. Their accuracy is not the fundamental good-making feature. Once we see 
that full belief plays a distinctive role in providing us with potential motivating 
reasons, a role that mere partial belief cannot play, we can see that gradational 
veritists cannot assume that gradational and categorical accuracy are desirable 
for the same reasons. Until we better understand why partial beliefs matter, we 
shouldn't assume that they realize some good simply by virtue of their 
gradational accuracy and that this accuracy calls for promotion.    
 
4.  Categorical Veritism and the Lockean View  
The focus of our discussion now shifts to a consequentialist approach to norms 
for full belief.  As we've seen, there is a plausible line of argument for the 
normative Lockean view, the view that says that it's rational to fully believe a 
proposition iff it's rational to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in that 
proposition. If, as categorical veritists believe, the cardinal epistemic good is true 
belief and the cardinal epistemic evil is false belief, the Lockean view might seem 
very attractive. It would seem to be motivated by this seemingly compelling line 
of argument:  
... a rational agent should be doing well by her own 
lights, in a particular way: roughly speaking, she 
should follow the epistemic rule that she rationally 
takes to be most truth-conducive. It would be 
irrational, the thought goes, to regard some epistemic 
rule as more truth-conducive than one’s own, but not 
adopt it (Horowitz 2014: 43). 
This captures the fundamental consequentialist rationale for recognizing an 
epistemic norm. Once we fix the right values for true and false belief, we can 
compare the expected categorical accuracy of each set and it seems that you have 
to prefer the ones that score better than your current set.   
 In these next two sections we'll see that it's not always rational to believe 
the things that Lockeans take to be rational. It's also not always desirable to 
believe in line with CVEC.  The fundamental consequentialist rationale for 
recognizing an epistemic norm is unsound.    
 
4.1 The Problem of Constraints 
On the Lockean view, it wouldn't be rational to fail to believe p if you rationally 
have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in p. The view thus denies that 
there can be constraints that prohibit full belief if they do not, inter alia, tell us to 
keep our credence below some threshold. The problem of constraints is the 
problem posed by the existence of a special kind of normative constraint on full 
belief that tells us that it's irrational to have a full belief even when rationality 
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permits or requires a sufficiently high degree of confidence in the target 
proposition. 
  Let's start with lottery propositions. Obviously it is rational to have a high 
degree of confidence in lottery propositions, but what about full belief? You 
know that the drawing was held yesterday, but it's not rational to fully believe 
that your ticket lost if you are going on the statistical information alone.31 To get 
this verdict, the Lockean would need to either argue that it's not rational to have 
a high degree of confidence in a lottery proposition or assign weights to the 
value of truth and falsity such that it's irrational to take the risk associated with 
full belief in spite of the fact that it's rational to have a high degree of confidence. 
Neither strategy is the slightest bit promising.  You wouldn't want to ignore the 
statistical information in proportioning your degree of belief to the evidence. You 
wouldn't want to assign too much weight to disvalue associated with false belief 
because it's rational to believe the things you read in the paper even though these 
beliefs have lower expected categorical accuracy than lottery beliefs. It looks as if 
the constraint against believing lottery propositions is a counterexample to the 
Lockean view. 
 Not everyone sees this counterexample as a counterexample. A standard 
response is to concede that we cannot know that lottery propositions but insist 
that we can rationally believe them. I disagree, but set that aside. Suppose we 
cannot know lottery propositions. We can use this concession against the 
Lockean. Consider the proposition expressed by, 'This ticket lost but I don't 
know if it did'. If we cannot know that our ticket is a loser, this is very likely to be 
true.  It is also a Moorean absurdity. It isn't just bad to say, it would be irrational 
to believe.32  
 The Lockean tries to dodge the first counterexample by saying that it's 
rational to have a high degree of confidence in lottery propositions and to believe 
them outright. If it is rational to have this high degree of confidence in lottery 
propositions, it better be rational to have a high degree of confidence in this 
Moorean absurdity.  This conjunction is the conjunction of the lottery proposition 
and an apriori truth about the subject's epistemic position. If it is rational to have 
a sufficiently high degree of confidence in the first conjunct, the same holds true 
for the conjunction. (There is no reason to think that if the support for a lottery 
proposition is sufficiently strong to make it rational to fully believe the 
proposition that the conjunction that includes the lottery proposition and the 
 
31 On this point, I agree with Bird (2007) and Nelkin (2000), though I prefer Bird's 
explanation. 
32 For discussion of Moorean absurdity and the rationality of belief, see Adler 
(2002) and Sorensen (1988). For dissent, see McGlynn (2013).  
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negative appraisal will have a sufficiently lower probability to fall below some 
line so that it's not sufficiently probable on the evidence.) Thus, the simple 
Lockean view implies mistakenly that it would be rational to believe that your 
ticket lost and that you don't know that it did.33  
  If it is irrational to believe both p and that p is not known, we have 
another counterexample to the Lockean view.  There should be constraints that 
rule out believing a proposition whilst believing that it is irrational to believe that 
proposition and constraints that rule out believing conjunctions where one 
conjunct represents the entire conjunction as irrational.34  In terms of expected 
accuracy, these negative epistemic self-appraisals all do very well. If it's rational 
to have high credence in the first, the Lockean should regard each of the 
following as rational:  
This ticket lost.   
This ticket lost but I don't know if it did.  
This ticket lost but I don't know if it did. It's irrational 
to believe that.  
I don't know that this losing ticket is a loser and it's 
irrational for me to believe this. 
Someone who didn't believe these things should see that conforming to 
constraints that prohibited these beliefs results in her doing worse given the aim 
of maximizing expected categorical accuracy than she would if she believed 
these propositions. A more permissive set of epistemic rules would do better 
from the perspective of truth-conducivity, but it hardly seems irrational to stick 
to rules that prohibit these negative epistemic self-appraisals.  Thus, we should 
be suspicious of the fundamental consequentialist rationale for recognizing 
epistemic norms. Someone who sees that she's failing to maximize expected 
accuracy should sometimes be unmoved by that fact. The consequentialist 
rationale rests on some mistake about the good, some mistake about the 
relationship between the good and the rational, or both.     
  
4.2 Foot Stomping 
 
33 Adler (2002) goes so far as to say that we cannot believe such things, but I 
submit that it would be irrational to believe them if we could and it would be 
irrational to both believe p and to separately believe that p is the kind of thing we 
cannot know when one fails to see the connection between the first-order belief 
and the negative assessment. 
34  For discussions of epistemic akrasia and defenses of this constraint, see 
Littlejohn (forthcoming), Titelbaum (2015), and Smithies (2012). 
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Sets of full belief that involve the negative epistemic self-appraisals do better in 
terms of expected categorical accuracy than those that lacked them, but it's hard 
to see how, from the perspective of rationality, it's desirable to have these 
categorically accurate full beliefs. It's not desirable from the perspective of 
rationality to believe things you know to be irrational even if this representation 
of your irrationality is accurate.  As Foot (1985) observed, there is something to 
the consequentialist thought that the right or rational has to do with what's better 
or best. It does seem irrational to prefer an acknowledged lesser good to a greater 
good, but if the objections presented in  §4.2.1 and §4.2.2 have the force I take 
them to, they show that the states of affairs that CVEC takes to be best or most 
desirable needn't be particularly good. Once we see this, we can see what's 
wrong with the consequentialist rationale sketched above. If we don't see 
anything particularly good in the states of affairs that proponents of CVEC insist 
are the best, we aren't guilty of preferring some lesser good to a greater one. We 
prefer the good and we can see that the good isn't simply a function of accuracy. 
The 'Foot stomping' objections are intended to show that the relationships 
between epistemic goodness and categorical accuracy are more complicated than 
CVEC suggests.35   
 
4.2.1 When is Categorical Accuracy Beneficial? When is Categorical Inaccuracy 
Harmful?  
According to CVEC categorical accuracy is always good to some extent. If a 
belief is true, it is pro tanto objectively good because of its categorical accuracy. If 
a set of beliefs is true, it would be pro tanto objectively good because of the 
categorical accuracy of its members.  If a belief is sufficiently probable on the 
evidence, it would be a good candidate for being a rational belief because of its 
prospective goodness or expected categorical accuracy.  Remember, though, that 
our categorical veritists are also consequentialists, so they'll allow that objective 
and prospective goodness are not the sole determinants of rational status. In this 
section we'll see that proponents of CVEC make three mistakes about the value 
of categorical accuracy. Their view doesn't allow for worthless accuracy, doesn't 
allow for the right kind of harmful accuracy, and falsely predicts that certain 
kinds of desirable beliefs are irrational. 
 Let's start with a case of worthless accuracy:  
 
35 I'm describing these objections as 'Foot stomping' in honor of Philippa Foot 
who rightly saw that there was often little good to be found in the states of affairs 
that the consequentialists took to be desirable and saw that seeing this was the 
key to seeing what's wrong with consequentialist reasoning.  See Foot (1985) for 
discussion. 
 24 
Gettier's Experience Machine: Gettier gets a good deal 
on Nozick's experience machine at a garage sale. He 
decides to step in for a while and see how it works. It 
works exceptionally well, so well in fact that he 
forgets that he's in it. It would please Gettier greatly if 
the Cubs made it to World Series. It seems to him just 
as if he's watching the game and watching them 
clinch the playoffs. As it happens, the Cubs just then 
did make it to the playoffs. A smile stretches across 
Gettier's face. 'They won', he says, 'They finally did 
it.'36 
Gettier's reason for being happy isn't that the Cubs won. The cost of being in the 
machine is that you've lost touch with reality. His belief that the Cubs won is 
accurate, but being in that state while being in the machine doesn't put him in a 
position to be happy for the reason that the Cubs won. That cannot guide him 
rationally in his feelings, thoughts, or deeds. Knowing what we know, we see 
that Gettier has lost track of reality.  I don't see much good that comes from being 
in the state of mind that he's in even though it is accurate.  If the point of full 
belief is to provide potential motivating reasons, this accurate belief fails and is a 
bad belief. 
 CVEC predicts that beliefs that are pro tanto good because of their 
categorical accuracy might also be harmful in a way that bears on their rational 
status. Consider a case that they'd describe as a case of harmful accuracy:  
Trump: For years I have believed that I would never 
believe that Trump would win the GOP primary and 
never know that Trump would win the GOP primary. 
Upon opening the paper, I learn that he won. This 
 
36 We might be able to construct similar examples to show that there's worthless 
gradational inaccuracy. The key to constructing such an example would be to 
describe a set of credences that have the good-making features that gradational 
veritists key in on while cutting the credences off from the sorts of systems that 
should be involved in their rational maintenance and revision.  If, say, the 
evidence that merits having a certain credence in a proposition is provided by 
something external to the credences themselves (e.g., experiences or apparent 
memories) we could test intuitions about the comparative goodness of two 
identical sets of credences where one set fits with experience and memory and 
the other does not.  I suspect that most people will see one set as better than 
another and that suggests that there's more to the good of good partial belief 
than gradational veritism suggests.  
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belief, while accurate, renders two standing beliefs 
mistaken.   
While my belief about Trump's success in the primary has a high degree of 
expected categorical accuracy, it also adds to the inaccuracy of my total epistemic 
state since it renders two standing beliefs false. The attitude makes a direct 
contribution to accuracy and indirect contribution to inaccuracy.  In this case, it 
seems that the harmful accuracy isn't harmful in a way that matters, not to 
rationality.  Even if the belief ensures that I'm worse off overall in terms of 
categorical accuracy, knowledge of this fact doesn't undermine the belief's 
rational standing. The fact that the belief detracts from total accuracy simply 
doesn't matter at all to the assessment of the belief.    
 CVEC predicts that some beliefs that are pro tanto bad because their 
categorical inaccuracy might be beneficial in a way that bears on their rational 
status:  
Flawed and Flawless: Agnes completes her latest 
work of non-fiction. Her fact-checker tells her that she 
found precisely one error in the manuscript but 
cannot recall where the mistake was. Agnes decides 
to note this in the book’s preface and sends it off to 
the publisher. Consider two versions of the case. 
Flawed: The fact checker was right. There was an 
error on p. 237. Flawless: The fact checker was wrong. 
There was no error in the body of the book.  
The preface sentence is part of Agnes' book. Let's suppose that Agnes believes 
each proposition expressed by the sentences in the book. In Flawed, the preface 
sentence expresses a true proposition, so it adds to the total amount of 
categorical accuracy. What about in Flawless? In Flawless, Agnes could not 
believe the proposition expressed by the preface sentence because there is no 
such proposition (and no such propositional attitude). If there were, it would 
either have to be accurate or inaccurate. It couldn't be the former, for then it 
would be the latter. It cannot be the latter, for then it would be the former. The 
accuracy contained in the body of the book functions as one of Prior's blocks and 
thus prevents Agnes from getting things right in the preface.37 
 Finally, how bad should a belief set be if it contains falsehoods? It might 
seem that each false belief should realize some negative value, each true belief 
 
37 For a discussion of these blocks, see Prior (1961). I first learned about these 
blocks and their significance from John Hawthorne's presentation on the surprise 
exam paradox.  It was Marian David who pointed out that the preface sentence 
would be a liar in cases like Flawless. 
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should realize some positive value, and the total value realized by the belief set is 
determined by simply adding up the positive value and subtracting out the 
negative value. Thus, when comparing two belief sets with equal numbers of 
true and false belief, they should contain equal amounts of categorical goodness 
and badness.38 If these subjects' beliefs concern different propositions but agree in 
terms of their expected categorical accuracy, these subjects should count as 
equally rational. This overlooks something important, though, which is the 
significance of the subject matter of these subjects' beliefs. Suppose Agnes gets 
some non-normative facts right in w1 and some facts about what rationality 
requires of her wrong in w1. Suppose Agnes gets the non-normative facts wrong 
in w2 but the facts about what rationality requires of her right. Even if we 
stipulate that Agnes has the same number of true beliefs and false beliefs in these 
worlds so that the only difference here concerns the subject matter of her beliefs, 
it seems that Agnes might have a greater number of rational beliefs in w2 than 
w1.39  Mistakes about rationality matter to rationality in ways that mistakes about 
matters of fact do not, but it is hard to see how the Lockean might do justice to 
this fact if we stipulate, as it seems we can, that Agnes' evidence warranted 
having high credence in all her beliefs in these two worlds.40 This suggests that 
 
38 This is not completely uncontroversial for reasons Sylvan (2013) discusses but 
this fits with the kinds of scoring rules used in the standard accuracy-first 
arguments.  
39 These kinds of cases put interesting pressures on the intuitions that underwrite 
the Immodesty Thesis, "The credences recommended by your own epistemic 
rule, given a body of evidence, should uniquely maximize expected accuracy for 
you" (Horowitz 2014: 43). Suppose this holds for both partial belief and full 
belief. Think about the cases of negative self-appraisal where it seems that 
rationality requires high credence in both p and the proposition that it's irrational 
to believe p. You should think that if you don't take that combination of full 
beliefs on that you would fail by your own lights to maximize expected 
categorical inaccuracy. You should also think that if you take those attitudes on 
that you would be irrational. Remember that the motivation for the Immodesty 
Thesis has to do with doing well by your own lights. It seems you wouldn't be 
doing well by your own lights if you add the attitudes or refrain if doing well is 
cashed out in veritist terms. If you don't add the attitudes, you don't love truth 
enough. if you add the attitudes because of a love of truth, you seem to suffer 
from a strange kind of misology.      
40  Lasonen-Aarnio (MS) and Field (2015) think that there can be rational 
'mismatch' between beliefs about the requirements of rationality and the first-
order attitudes that rationality permits, requires, or forbids.   
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it's a mistake to think that all that matters to rationality are considerations of 
expected categorical accuracy.41 
 The Foot stomping objection comes to this. When we see the various ways 
in which a state might be accurate or might make a contribution to accuracy or 
inaccuracy, it seems that there is often nothing bad in what CVEC classifies as 
overall bad and nothing good in what CVEC classifies as overall good or pro 
tanto good.  The direct inaccuracy of our beliefs matters, but indirect inaccuracy 
sometimes does not, not when it comes to assessing the particular belief. The 
direct accuracy of our beliefs sometimes matters, but not always, and when it 
matters it matters in a way that indirect accuracy does not. There is something 
wrong with the consequentialist concern for aggregate accuracy and the role that 
belief plays in bringing it about. Thus, we might acknowledge that other belief 
sets do better in terms of overall goodness as characterized by categorical 
veritism and be unmoved by this. 
    
4.2.2 Goodness and Grain 
I want to highlight a further way in which it is a mistake to fixate on accuracy in 
the way that accuracy-first epistemologists have. We'll look at a worry about 
granularity. Accuracy is too coarse-grained to do the work CVEC needs it to do. 
  In the value theory there are two goods to consider, goods that play 
different roles.  According to categorical veritism, actual or objective epistemic 
goodness is a function of the accuracy or inaccuracy of a subject's full beliefs and 
it determines how well things are going for the subject. Expected categorical 
goodness is a function of the probability of categorical accuracy or inaccuracy 
and it determines what's rational for a subject to believe, according to CVEC.  
Let's consider the categorical veritist's approach to objective epistemic goodness. 
Let's suppose that propositions and propositional attitudes are individuated in a 
Fregean way. Beliefs in two propositions that differ only at the level of sense will 
count as distinct beliefs.   
 
41 For arguments that there cannot be rational false beliefs about the requirements 
of rationality, see Littlejohn (forthcoming) and Titelbaum (2015). As Dorst (MS) 
notes, a Lockean needn't have a single, fixed threshold for all beliefs for the 
Lockean might assign different amounts of disvalue to different falsehoods on 
the basis of the beliefs' subject matters. This has the effect of raising the threshold 
of evidential support needed to rationally believe the relevant propositions, but I 
fear that this strategy raises the bar too high to be plausible and I fear that there 
is no particularly good independent motivation for thinking that the disvalue 
associated with false beliefs about rationality is greater than the disvalue 
associated with, say, false beliefs about astronomy or the law. 
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 Accuracy is assessed at the level of reference, not sense. The belief that 
Hesperus shines is accurate iff the belief that Phosphorus shines is.  Suppose 
Agnes doesn't realize that Hesperus is Phosphorus, believes that Hesperus shines 
in the morning, and believes that Phosphorus shines in the evening. Let's 
suppose that these beliefs constitute knowledge and are supported by the 
evidence.  In short, let's suppose that Agnes is doing very well, epistemically.  
Suppose that Agnes' twin is nearly identical to Agnes. She has all of Agnes' 
evidence concerning the propositions that Hesperus shines in the morning and 
that Phosphorus shines in the morning. Both propositions have high degrees of 
expected categorical accuracy. Suppose, however, that her mental life differs 
from Agnes' only in these two respects: instead of believing that Hesperus shines 
in the morning she believes that Phosphorus does and instead of believing that 
Phosphorus shines in the evening she believes that Hesperus does.   
 While Agnes' and Agnes' twin have beliefs that score equally well in terms 
of objective categorical accuracy, they don't do equally well in terms of objective 
epistemic goodness. In spite of the fact that their beliefs concerning Hesperus 
and Phosphorus are equally accurate representations of that heavenly body, 
Agnes' attitudes are preferable because they are intelligible to Agnes in a way 
that her twins' attitudes couldn't be. Objective epistemic goodness depends upon 
accuracy and the way that things are presented. The twin's beliefs are perfectly 
accurate but they don't seem to be particularly good states to be in. Modes of 
presentation matter and they don't just matter to rationality or expected 
goodness. This raises a difficult question for the accuracy-first epistemologists. 
Why should something like mode of presentation or sense matter for objective 
epistemic value if the cardinal epistemic good is accuracy or truth?42 
 
42 We'll see that a rival account offers a straightforward explanation.  Proponents 
of accuracy-first epistemology might want to employ a fine-grained notion of a 
truth and say that 'Hesperus shines' and Phosphorus shines' express different 
truths to try to get a handle on these kinds of problems but difficult questions 
would remain. Why, we might ask, should these believing these truths differ in 
value if they don't differ with respect to their accuracy? Even if their view of 
truth and the individuation of truths allows them to say that Agnes had different 
truths in mind in the examples just described the veritist thinks that the number 
of truths and falsehoods determines the total value of a subject's epistemic state.  
Thus, they cannot use some fine-grained notion of truth to try to vindicate the 
intuition that Agnes would be worse off in terms of objective or actual value if 
her beliefs were altered in the way described.   We'll see that the alternative value 
theory proposed in the next section provides a natural answer to this question 
and handles many of the other difficulties that arise for veritism as well. 
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 This problem is masked to some extent because expected, not actual, 
categorical accuracy is what matters most directly to rationality and expected 
categorical accuracy is the sort of thing that will be sensitive to modes of 
presentation.  Still, there are problems with granularity and expected categorical 
accuracy that arise for CVEC.  Recall the cases involving conjunctions of lottery 
propositions and negative self-appraisals.  It is irrational to believe lottery 
propositions and highly irrational to believe the conjunction of such a 
proposition with a negative epistemic self-appraisal (e.g., to believe that this 
ticket is a loser and that I don't know that it is). It seems worse from the point of 
view of rationality, however, for Agnes to believe that her ticket is a loser and 
that she doesn't know that it is than it would be for Agnes to believe this about 
others who hold tickets for the same lottery.43 Agnes shouldn't believe on the 
basis of purely statistical information that her friend's ticket will lose and that her 
friend doesn't know this, but it doesn't seem that this belief that involves a 
negative epistemic appraisal of someone else is as deeply and strikingly 
irrational as beliefs that involve negative appraisal of her currently held 
attitudes. In spite of a striking difference in how irrational these beliefs would be 
they do not differ with respect to their expected categorical accuracy.  The 
properties that determine whether a belief constitutes a Moorean absurdity do 
not supervene upon the properties that determine actual or expected categorical 
accuracy. 
  
4.3 Trade-Offs 
We finally we come to the familiar problem of trade-offs.44 We've seen a version 
of the problem in the course of discussing GVEC. Once we find a version of the 
 
43 There is another striking difference to note. Consider the rational status of 
Agnes' belief that her mother's ticket lost and that her mother's belief that it lost 
doesn't constitute knowledge. Suppose it is based, in part, upon her mother's 
testimony and what she read in the paper. This belief about her mother's belief 
and ticket would have a high degree of expected categorical accuracy but it 
might have a lower degree of expected categorical accuracy than a belief she has 
about a ticket she holds for some other lottery and her belief in her own inability 
to know that this ticket is a loser.  The properties that make for the irrationality of 
the belief include those that determine whether the belief is about your own 
beliefs, not just its expected categorical accuracy.  
44 The earliest discussions of trade-offs were Firth (1981) and Jenkins (2007). In 
Littlejohn (2012), I argued that the trade-off problem was a problem for 
Goldman's rule-consequentialist arguments for reliabilism. The trade-off 
problem is also discussed in Berker (2013) and Greaves (2013).  For responses to 
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view that introduced the incentives necessary to address the problems of partial 
opinionation and population, we saw that the view would deliver the wrong 
verdict in trade-off cases by classifying rational beliefs as irrational because of 
their opportunity costs.  Even if some belief constitutes knowledge, the 
opportunity cost associated with holding this belief might be so great that CVEC 
would classify the belief as irrational on the grounds that suspension or disbelief 
has a greater expected amount of categorical accuracy. (Maybe knowing how 
clever you are will keep you out of Athena's private library.) It seems that 
however bad a belief might be, the expected boost in categorical accuracy might 
be so great that CVEC would classify the belief as rationally required. (Maybe the 
key to living long enough to benefit from time in Athena's library is the belief 
that Zeus is the greatest conceivable being.)   
 Trade-offs arise because consequentialists are concerned with the total 
value associated with options where an option is understood as the world that 
would or could be realized if a subject were to form a belief. In turn they hold 
that there's an important difference between pro tanto harms and benefits that 
come in the form of the categorical accuracy or inaccuracy of a full belief and the 
overall harms and benefits that we only determine by calculating the total 
categorical accuracy associated with belief, disbelief, and suspension contained 
in an option.  These cases have been discussed elsewhere, but I think that some 
implications of these cases has been overlooked. These implications have to do 
with CVEC's attitude towards pretty patterns and putative principles.   
 Suppose a subject knows that her belief in p would be both a belief that is 
highly probable and a belief that would prevent the believer from maximizing 
actual categorical accuracy (e.g., the benefits associated with believing that a 
lottery ticket is a loser is good enough that the way to maximize total categorical 
accuracy would be to refrain from believing the ticket will win.) Such cases show 
that if it's possible to have high credence without full belief, this is what 
rationality would require according to CVEC. Thus, CVEC implies that there are 
possible situations in which it's rational to have high credence without full belief, 
a situation that would be a counterexample to the normative Lockean thesis. If 
there's an argument from CVEC to the conclusion that there are counterexamples 
to the Lockean thesis, we shouldn't turn to consequentialism to find a vindication 
for the Lockean thesis. 
 Suppose Agnes knows p and knows that some of p's consequences will be 
revealed if a card is flipped over. Agnes also knows that, owing to the strange 
causal structure of the world, if she believes these consequences the total 
 
Berker and Greaves, see Ahlstrom-Vij and Dunn (2014) and Konek and 
Levinstein (MS) respectively.    
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categorical accuracy of her beliefs will be worse than they'd be if she believed p 
and failed to believe some of the consequences of p written on the card. If she 
were to believe what's written on the card, these beliefs would do well in terms 
of its categorical accuracy but CVEC implies that she should refrain from holding 
them.  We can use cases like this to cause trouble for closure. If it's possible to 
believe p and refrain from believing p's consequences, this combination might do 
better than alternatives in terms of expected categorical accuracy and would thus 
be rationally preferable to belief sets that involved both the belief in p and its 
consequences. CVEC implies that there can be situations in which rational belief 
isn't closed under known entailment. Tinkering with the causal structure of the 
world and the costs and benefits associated with being in certain states of mind, 
we should be able to use CVEC to generate counterexamples to principles of all 
sorts and show that the prettiness of a pattern is an unreliable guide to the 
rational standing of the beliefs that figure in it.   
  
5. Three Mistakes 
I have identified a variety of problems with the accuracy-first approach to norms 
for partial and full belief.  What should we take from this? I think proponents of 
the accuracy-first approach make two mistakes about the fundamental epistemic 
good and are liable to make a further mistake about the relationships between 
partial and full belief. 
 It is a mistake to think of accuracy as the cardinal epistemic good. It is 
merely required for the realization of that good because, as we saw, some 
accuracy is worthless.  In §4 we saw that two epistemic states that do equally 
well in terms of accuracy might not do equally well in terms of their total 
objective epistemic value. We also saw that certain kinds of purely accidental 
connections between belief and fact meant that beliefs that matched the facts 
weren't good because they failed to track reality.  In §3 we saw that the strongest 
argument for categorical veritism was one that focused on the value that beliefs 
realize when they track reality.  A belief provides a potential motivating reason 
iff it tracks reality.  An accurate belief can fail to track reality in the right way, but 
not if it constitutes knowledge. It turns out that the best argument for veritism is 
actually an argument for thinking that knowledge, not mere true belief, is the 
fundamental epistemic good. This is because a belief provides a potential 
motivating reason iff it constitutes knowledge. Some accurate beliefs don't do 
what they're supposed to.  
 It's easy to make sense of the points about epistemic goodness in §4 if we 
replace veritism with conscientiaism, the view that knowledge is the cardinal 
epistemic good. Conscientiasm also helps us make sense of the counterexamples 
to the normative Lockean thesis. The recipe for counterexamples should now be 
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obvious. We look for beliefs that do well in terms of expected categorical 
accuracy. These would be propositions that the Lockean and proponents of 
CVEC would classify as rationally permitted. (It would if we bracket trade-offs.) 
We then focus on the subset of these beliefs that are 'known unknowns' and find 
our counterexamples. 45  We know apriori that we cannot know lottery 
propositions, so it's not rational to believe them. We know apriori that we cannot 
know the negative epistemic self-appraisals and Moorean absurdities, so we 
cannot rationally believe them.46 We know it matters if we know apriori that some 
belief doesn't constitute knowledge because that means we know apriori that 
these are bad beliefs, beliefs that cannot do what they're supposed to. 
 It might be thought that an epistemic consequentialist could avoid these 
difficulties by embracing conscientiaism, but they cannot. Conscientiaism isn't 
for consequentialists. Epistemic consequentialism assumes that the fundamental 
epistemic good is a promotional good. It would be perverse to apply decision-
theoretic norms to goods that aren't promotional goods (e.g., things that are 
attributively good like good assassins or good toasters or things that are 
normatively good (i.e., good in the sense that something is good by virtue of 
being right, appropriate, or fitting).) I think we have two good pieces of evidence 
that the fundamental epistemic good isn't a promotional good.  
 First, if the fundamental epistemic good were a promotional good, it 
would be irrational to believe when it's improbable that a belief realizes the 
relevant good. Think about the way in which CVEC implies that if p is 
improbable, it is irrational to believe p. If we modify the value theory by 
swapping knowledge for true belief and belief that fails to constitute knowledge 
for false belief, would we want to say that if it is improbable that p is known that 
it is irrational to believe p? No, not if it's possible to know p when it isn't probable 
that you know p.47 As Flannery O'Connor might have said, no man with a good 
 
45 This is Sutton's (2007) memorable terminology. The key thing to notice is that 
knowledge requires both high probability and further conditions that we know 
needn't be met when beliefs have high probability. The judgment that you're not 
in a position to know p doesn't require you to think that the reason for failing to 
know p is that p isn't sufficiently probable on your evidence. It might be that you 
don't know because success wouldn't be attributable to ability, your belief 
wouldn't be safe, your belief wouldn't be sensitive, etc. 
46 We know apriori that we cannot know <p and I don't know p> because of the 
factivity of 'knows'. Assuming that knowledge of p implies rational belief in p 
(for mature humans, at any rate) we can see why we cannot know <p and it's not 
rational for me to believe p>. 
47 See Williamson (2011). 
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belief needs to be justified. If you know, that's good enough for a rational belief. 
Rationality doesn't require that a belief is probably an instance of knowledge, 
only that it is.  
 Second, we shouldn't forget that nearly everyone agrees that trade-offs are 
perverse. If the fundamental epistemic good were a promotional good, it would 
be perverse not to accept trade-offs. Refusing to accept a trade-off would be like 
refusing to accept an acknowledged greater good for a lesser one. That isn't how 
we see things when we think about Agnes' knowledge of history. We don't think 
that it is irrational for Agnes to have the beliefs that constitute knowledge even 
when we recognize that possessing this knowledge comes at a cost and precludes 
her knowing lots of things that she could have learned by doing mental math.48      
  These points about the importance of knowledge and the kind of good 
knowledge isn't are sufficient to show that the accuracy-first project is 
fundamentally flawed, but I want to close by making a point about full and 
partial belief. Suppose everything went as planned. All the counterexamples to 
the normative Lockean view work. We accept that the fundamental epistemic 
good is knowledge because the realization of that good requires a belief that 
tracks reality, not just a belief that happens to match it. We now have the 
materials for an argument against a simple version of the metaphysical Lockean 
view, the view that says that a subject has a full belief iff she has a sufficiently 
high degree of confidence.49  
 On this view, a subject couldn't refrain from believing p if she had a 
sufficiently high degree of confidence in p because her belief in p just is this high 
degree of confidence in p. If we suppose that 'ought' implies 'can', the examples 
discussed above that show that a subject often ought to refrain from believing 
even when she rationally has a sufficiently high degree of confidence show that 
it's possible to have high credence in a proposition that isn't believed. When a 
 
48 In Littlejohn (forthcoming b), I provide further arguments for conscientiaism 
and for a teleological and non-consequentialist approach to epistemic norms for 
justification and for rationality.  On this view, a belief would be justified if it did 
what beliefs are supposed to do (i.e., provide us with potential motivating 
reasons) and would be rational if formed in such a way that it or some similar 
belief would constitute knowledge.  For discussion of the link between 
knowledge and rationality, see Bird (2007). One nice feature of Bird's account is 
that it treats the preface and the lottery differently. Lottery beliefs are irrational 
because they are known unknowns and preface beliefs are sometimes rational 
because they are potential cases of knowledge. The accuracy-first approach 
seems to treat them similarly.      
49 See Sturgeon (2008) for a helpful discussion of the metaphysical Lockean thesis. 
 34 
prospective belief is flagged as an unknown, it's possible to both have high 
credence in p and fail to have a full belief in p.  If the belief would be a known 
unknown, it would be right to have high credence without full belief because the 
full belief couldn't do what it's supposed to do and the high credence might well 
do what it's supposed to do.50   
 Many epistemologists see full belief and partial belief as playing similar 
roles (e.g., pushing you around in certain ways). If you start to think of partial 
and full belief this way, it's not surprising that you'd be tempted to accept a 
version of the metaphysical Lockean picture. The picture is much less attractive, 
however, once we identify a point or purpose for full belief that mere partial 
belief cannot serve.  A full belief is supposed to track the facts so that it can 
provide you with a potential motivating reason, a fact that can be your reason for 
believing, feeling, or doing something. No partial belief can do that.51 Because of 
this, it makes sense to have a norm that, inter alia, enjoins us not to have a full 
belief in p when we know we couldn't know p.52 However high our confidence 
gets in p, if we know that we cannot know, we know that a full belief could not 
do what it's supposed to do. The partial belief, however, could presumably fulfill 
its function when the strength of this belief is proportional to the probability of 
the target proposition.  
 While we haven't yet specified the point or purpose of partial belief, this 
suggests that we should talk about points and purposes of full belief and partial 
belief respectively, acknowledge that they answer to divergent normative 
standards, and recognize that a partial belief however strongly held needn't 
constitute a full belief. Partial beliefs come into their own when we have 
middling credences or have to reason about known unknowns.  Full beliefs do 
their work by tracking facts so that they can serve as our reasons for believing, 
feeling, and doing what we do.  This proposal allows for a kind of unity in the 
cases where it is an open possibility that the subject could come to know. In these 
 
50 For further discussion of the possibility that the relation between partial and 
full belief might be more complicated than the simple Lockean picture 
presupposes, see Buchak (2014), Locke (2014), and Staffel (forthcoming). 
51 Consider Adler's (2002: 17) observation that mild resentment is the result of a 
full belief that someone did something a little bit bad, not the product of having 
some partial belief with middling credence that someone did something 
unspeakably bad.     
52 I take this norm to be derivative from the more fundamental norm that enjoins 
you to refrain from believing p when your belief in p wouldn't constitute 
knowledge but the present account doesn't assume that this is the fundamental 
norm of belief. 
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cases it's possible that a sufficiently strong partial belief might constitute a full 
belief, but attending to the cases where the subject appreciates that she's not in a 
position to know helps us recognize the differing purposes of partial and full 
belief and the need to reject the Lockean suggestion that the norms for full belief 
simply grow out of the norms for partial belief. The aim of full belief is 
knowledge. The aim of partial belief is something else, something it can attain 
when we know we cannot know. Partial belief and full belief need norms of their 
own because they serve different purposes. 
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